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Abstract 
 
We show that the logic of Arrow's theorem of the deductible, i.e. that it is optimal to focus 
insurance coverage on the states with largest expenditures, remains at work in a model with ex 
post moral hazard. The optimal insurance contract takes the form of a system of "implicit 
deductibles", i.e. it results in the same indemnities as a contract with full insurance above a 
variable deductible positively related to the elasticity of medical expenditures with respect to the 
insurance rate. In a model with an explicit stop-loss arrangement, i.e. with a predefined ceiling on 
the annual expenses of the insured, this stop-loss takes the form of a deductible, i.e. there is no 
reimbursement for expenses below the stop-loss amount. One motivation to have some insurance 
below the deductible arises if regular health care expenditures in a situation of standard health 
have a negative effect on the probability of getting into a state with large medical expenses. 
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1 Introduction
One of the most elegant results in the theory of optimal insurance is Arrows
so-called theorem of the deductible: If an insurance company is willing
to o¤er any insurance policy against loss desired by the buyer at a premium
which depends only on the policys actuarial value, then the policy chosen by
a risk-averting buyer will take the form of 100% coverage above a deductible
minimum (Arrow, 1963). In his seminal article, Arrow assumed that the
loading factor is proportional to total (expected) reimbursements and that
the buyer maximizes expected utility. However, these assumptions are not
essential for the basic result. The optimal insurance policy features a pos-
itive deductible as soon as the loading increases with total reimbursements
(see, e.g., Zweifel et al., 2009). Moreover, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996)
have shown that a deductible insurance policy second-degree stochastically
dominates any other feasible insurance policy, and that deductibles should
therefore be preferred by all risk-averse agents even if they are not expected
utility-maximizers. The robustness of Arrows result reects its simple logic:
since it is better for the consumer to insure expenditures when disposable
income is low rather than high, insurance funds should always be spent on
the highest expenditures.
In its original form, Arrows theorem does not apply under moral haz-
ard. This explains why, despite its strong intuitive appeal, it did not play
an important role in later developments of the theory of optimal health in-
surance. With full insurance above a deductible, the ex post marginal cost
to the insured of additional expenses beyond the deductible is zero, leading
to ex post over-consumption. Following another lead in Arrow (1963), the
literature has focused on this moral hazard problem and has analysed how
introducing coinsurance, i.e. partial reimbursement of expenses, may lower
the incentives for overconsumption. The optimal level of coinsurance should
then strike a balance between the welfare loss of moral hazard, calling for a
larger out-of-pocket share for the insured, and the welfare gain of risk shar-
ing, calling for a more generous reimbursement (Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser,
1970).1
Most models in the literature have assumed a linear insurance scheme
1An extensive survey of the literature on optimal health insurance, including more
references, can be found in Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) and McGuire (2012). Both
chapters also comment on the variety of medical insurance policies in the real world.
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with a xed coinsurance rate. Note that this linear structure is an assump-
tion, not a result of the theory. The simple logic of Arrows theorem cannot
be recovered in this approach. Moreover, the assumption of a xed coin-
surance rate does not t insurance policies in the real world which often
have nonlinear features, such as explicit deductibles or a (possibly income-
dependent) stop-loss, i.e. a maximum imposed on total out-of-pocket pay-
ments of the consumer. The authoritative RAND-experiment (Manning et
al., 1987) introduced in its experimental policies partial rst-dollar insurance
and a stop-loss, although the researchers were well aware that this would
make it more di¢ cult to compare their results to the existing literature.2
As another example, our home country, Belgium, has a social insurance
system with a highly di¤erentiated structure of co-payments and with an
income-dependent stop loss, the so-called maximum billing system.3 The
theoretical results derived from a model with a constant coinsurance rate
may be misleading when one wants to analyse these more complex real-world
systems. However, formulating a more general theoretical model has been
considered di¢ cult and non-rewarding. Commenting on Blomqvist (1997),
who solves through optimal control theory a model of non-linear health in-
surance, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000, pp. 586-587) conclude: Alas, this is
a complicated problem, whose algebra is not particularly revealing.
In this paper, which builds upon the analysis in Drèze (2002), we derive
the optimal insurance policy in a general model with a discrete number of
states of health and we show that Arrows theorem of the deductible remains
relevant in a setting with moral hazard. In section 2 we introduce our model
and we derive the original Arrow-result in a simple rst-best setting. In
section 3 we introduce ex post moral hazard. We nd the usual trade-o¤
between moral hazard and risk sharing, but we also show how the logic of
Arrows theorem of the deductible is still at work in this more general model.
The optimality results can be interpreted in terms of an implicit deductible
property, namely: Arrows theorem holds over subsets of cases characterised
2The authors are crystal-clear about their position: We make no apologies for this
intentional noncomparability; a constant coinsurance rate, while convenient for obtaining
comparative statics results, is not an insurance policy that theory suggests would be
optimal, assuming risk aversion. Indeed, an optimal policy would almost certainly contain
a stop-loss feature, exactly as the experimental plans did(Manning et al., 1987, referring
to Arrow).
3These features are partly motivated by redistributive considerations altogether ab-
sent from the present paper.
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by similar elasticities of medical expenses with respect to insurance rates,
with elasticity-related deductibles; under a single common elasticity, Arrows
theorem holds, but the deductible increases with that elasticity (which plays
the same role as the loading factor). Linear coinsurance schemes are sub-
optimal, as  conditional on the demand elasticity  insurance has to be
more generous for larger expenditures. We compare our approach to the
one of Blomqvist (1987). In section 4 we analyse a system (not considered
in Drèze (2002)) with an explicit stop-loss, i.e. with a predened ceiling on
the annual expenses of the insured, and we show how Arrows result survives
the introduction of ex post moral hazard, i.e. ex post moral hazard does
not o¤er an argument to introduce partial rst-dollar insurance (as in the
RAND experiment and in Belgium) and demand elasticities become irrel-
evant. However, Section 5 suggests that some rst-dollar insurance can be
rationalized in a setting with ex ante moral hazard. We relate our ndings
to the literature on willingness to pay for safety" (Dehez and Drèze, 1982),
to existing models on optimal insurance for prevention (Ellis and Manning,
2007) and to the recent literature stressing the importance of taking into
account cross-price e¤ects in a setting with more health care commodities
(Goldman and Philipson, 2007). Section 6 concludes.
2 First best: Arrows theorem in a simple model
In its simplest form, a medical insurance problem concerns an individual
facing uncertainty about her future health condition. There are S states
of health indexed s = 1; :::; S with probabilities ps. Individuals have condi-
tional preferences between vectors (Ms; Cs) 2 <2+, whereMs > 0 and Cs > 0
stand respectively for medical expenditures and for disposable wealth (or ex-
penditures on consumption exclusive of medical expenditures) in state s: In
general these preferences could be represented by state-dependent utility
functions Us(Ms; Cs). To simplify the analysis we assume, in line with much
of the related literature, that preferences are separable between medical ex-
penditure and consumption and that preferences over disposable wealth are
state-independent, i.e. Us(Ms; Cs) = fs(Ms) + g(Cs):
4 The function fs(Ms)
captures both the e¤ect of medical expenditures on health and the e¤ect of
4The general model is analysed in Drèze (2002).
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health on utility.5 We assume fs and g to be continuously di¤erentiable and
strictly concave, i.e. f 0s > 0; f 00s < 0; g0 > 0; g00 < 0: We also assume that
resources are state-independent, i.e. Ws = Wt = W for all s; t = 1; :::; S.
Under these assumptions, preferences over S-vectors of medical expenditures
and disposable wealth are represented by the expected utility
V (M;C) =
X
s
ps [fs(Ms) + g(Cs)] : (1)
The individual may buy medical insurance sMs; 0 6 s 6 1 at a
premium
 = (1 + )
X
s
pssMs; (2)
where  is a state-independent loading factor and s is a state-specic in-
surance rate (with 1 s as the coinsurance rate). The assumption that the
insurance rate s can be state-specic seems to suggest that the state s is
observable. This is in general not a realistic assumption. We will return to
this issue later on.
Let us now consider optimal health insurance in a rst-best setting with-
out moral hazard. This means that the individual decisions about medical
expenditures in state s take into account their impact on the premium .
The optimal policy is then found by solving the problem
max
1;:::;S ;M1;:::;MS
V (M;C) =
X
s
ps [fs(Ms) + g(W      (1  s)Ms)] (3)
subject to eq. (2). The rst-order conditions are
dV
dMs
= ps

f 0s   (1  s)g0s
  (1 + )pssX
t
ptg
0
t = 0; (4)
dV
ds
= psMs
"
g0s   (1 + )
X
t
ptg
0
t
#
6 0; s
dV
ds
= 0: (5)
5Our model can be interpreted as a shortcut for Us(Ms; Cs) = v(Hs)+ g(Cs), with Hs
indicating health in state s, inuenced by health care expenditures, i.e. Hs = hs(Ms).
Our assumptions of separability of preferences and state-independence of g(:) remove the
potential e¤ect of health on the marginal utility of income. It is well known that a non-zero
cross-e¤ect complicates all the results on optimal insurance and that the empirical infor-
mation at this moment does not allow us to make strong statements about the (variable)
signs of cross-e¤ects.
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Simplifying these rst-order conditions immediately yields
for all s = 1; :::; S, f 0s = g
0
s (6)
and
either s = 0 or g0s = (1 + )
X
t
ptg
0
t := (1 + )g
0: (7)
Eq. (6) shows that medical expenditures are set optimally, with marginal
benets equal to marginal costs in each state s.
Eq. (7) is more interesting. Since (1 + )g0 is independent of s, g0s (and
therefore (1   s)Ms) will be the same for all states s with s > 0. Dene
the deductible D := (1   s)Ms and write g0D for the marginal utility of
wealth at C =W     D. We can then rewrite eq. (7) as
s = max(0;
Ms  D
Ms
); g0D = (1 + )g
0: (8)
This is precisely Arrows theorem of the deductible. The marginal utility of
wealth must be the same in all states for which s > 0; if medical expen-
ditures are smaller than D, expenses are fully borne by the insured. Note
that, if the loading factor  = 0, we get full insurance (g0s = g0 for all s).
Note also that this deductible policy can easily be implemented, even if the
state s is not observable.
It is readily veried that, under DARA preferences,6 in the optimum D
is increasing in W and  but decreasing in risk aversion, as measured for
instance by the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.7
3 Second best: Ex post moral hazard and implicit
deductibles
While the logic of Arrows theorem of the deductible in the case of rst-best
is well known, we will now show that this logic remains at work in a second-
best context with ex post moral hazard. In this setting it takes the form of
an implicit deductibleproperty.
6DARA: decreasing absolute risk aversion.
7The impact of an increase in risk on the optimal level of the deductible is analysed in
Eeckhoudt et al. (1991).
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We speak of ex post-moral hazardwhen the treatment is chosen by
the insured after observing the state, thus without regard for the impact of
Ms on the premium : In state s, (s)he therefore solves the problem
max
Ms
fs(Ms) + g(W      (1  s)Ms)
yielding the rst-order condition
f 0s = g
0
s(1  s): (9)
Condition (9) immediately reveals the overconsumption feature induced
by the insurance policy: instead of obtaining a marginal rate of substitution
between medical expenditures Ms and consumption expenditures Cs equal
to unity (as in eq. (6)), we now obtain a marginal rate of substitution
equal to 1   s, which is smaller than 1 in all states where s > 0. The
higher is the insured fraction s, the higher is overconsumption.8 We write
medical expenditures as a function Ms(s) of the insurance rate and we
dene the elasticity of medical expenditure with respect to the insurance
rate as s =
s
Ms
dMs
ds
.
The optimal insurance problem now becomes
max
1;:::;S
 =
X
s
ps [fs(Ms(s)) + g(W      (1  s)Ms(s))]
subject to
 = (1 + )
X
s
pssMs(s):
This yields the rst-order conditions
@
@s
= ps

f 0s
dMs
ds
+ g0s

Ms   (1  s)dMs
ds

 (1 + )ps

Ms + s
dMs
ds
X
t
ptg
0
t 6 0; (10)
s
@
@s
= 0: (11)
Using eq. (9) and the denition of s, we can simplify eq. (10) as
@
@s
= psMs

g0s   g0 (1 + ) (1 + s)

(12)
8The rst-best result obtains if s = 0. If s = 1; one gets f 0s = 0:
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Combing (11) and (12) we immediately derive the characteristics of the
optimal insurance policy:
either s = 0 or g0s = (1 + )g
0(1 + s) (13)
It is instructive to compare eqs. (13) and (7). If the demand elasticities
in the di¤erent health states are equal, i.e. s =  for all s, we are back
to the deductible result of Arrows theorem, but with the loading factor
(1 + ) blown up by the moral hazard factor (1 + ). Not surprisingly, the
deductible will therefore be larger than in the rst-best. More generally, the
solution is characterized by an implicit deductible property, where the
deductible increases with s. We formulate this result as
Proposition 1 If resources are state-independent, preferences are separable
with state-independent consumption preferences and the probabilities of the
di¤erent states cannot be inuenced by the consumer, the optimal insurance
contract results in the same indemnities as a contract with 100% insurance
above a variable deductible positively related to s, the elasticity of medical
expenditures with respect to the insurance rate s.
It is important to interpret Proposition 1 correctly. Consider the special
case with s =  for all s. This case is not devoid of interest. Indeed, the
empirical information on the di¤erences between the demand elasticities in
di¤erent health states is limited, and in many cases the best one has is a
global estimate which can be interpreted as an average. One could then
apply (13) with this common . This will in general be suboptimal, but
there is a saving grace: the uncertainty about  is borne by the insurer, not
the insured; and the insurer is compensated for bearing uncertainty through
the loading factor . This strongly suggests that a deductible (or a stop-
loss arrangement) should be an important feature in any optimal insurance
policy. Note, however, that (13) characterises a second-best insurance pol-
icy implemented through the variable insurance rates s = (Ms   D)=Ms,
not through the explicit announcement of a deductible D. Indeed, if the
indemnities sMs were formulated as Ms   D, then the rst-order condi-
tions (9) should be replaced by f 0s(Ms) = 0, reecting the fact that the
insured perceives a marginal cost of medical expenditures equal to 0 in that
case. Moreover, one can argue that health states are costly to verify and
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that the assumption of state-specic insurance rates is therefore unrealis-
tic.9 This need not always be true. One could for instance think about
a model with two states: a goodhealth state in which only ambulatory
care is needed and a badhealth state with a hospitalization and intensive
follow-up treatment. These states are readily veriable and our proposition
1 then gives an immediate justication for the feature present in many real
world systems of a higher insurance rate for hospital expenditures. Yet, in
general we are ready to admit that the rule (13) has limited applicability. In
the next section we will therefore analyse a setting with an explicit stop-loss
arrangement.
The fact that the results in this section do not lend themselves easily to
implementation, does not mean that our qualitative ndings are devoid of
practical implications. Let us summarize the most important ones. First,
our results conrm the intuition that insurance rates should (ceteris paribus)
be inversely related to the elasticity of health care expenditures with re-
spect to the insurance rate and positively related to risk aversion. More
importantly, they also validate the practice of (ceteris paribus) higher in-
surance rates (not only indemnities) for major medical expenses. Note that,
if s = t, it follows from eq. (13) that (1 s)Ms = (1 t)Mt and there-
fore s > t if Ms > Mt. This is an important qualitative nding, which
obviously cannot be recovered in a linear model with a xed insurance rate.
Second, our results suggest an easy empirical procedure for the ex post-
evaluation of existing systems of health insurance on the basis of information
about individual out-of-pocket payments. This information is often avail-
able. If interindividual di¤erences in risk aversion are not too large and
if demand elasticities in the di¤erent health states can be assumed to be
equal, an optimal insurance scheme should put an income-dependent ceiling
on these out-of-pocket payments in di¤erent states. More generally, out-
of-pocket payments should be linked in a straightforward way to demand
elasticities. One could either use the available information about demand
elasticities to check the optimality of the existing scheme, or derive the im-
plicit demand elasticities which would make the existing scheme optimal
and check if they show a reasonable pattern.
9Moreover, if a su¢ ciently rened classication of health states were veriable, there
would be no need to specify the indemnity through the insurance rate. One could as well
dene a lump-sum indemnity, specic to state s: this would immediately solve the moral
hazard-problem.
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Third, our results strongly suggest that the common assumption of a
constant insurance rate s = , identical in all states, is suboptimal. The
optimal medical insurance scheme will in general be nonlinear. This suggests
a comparison with Blomqvist (1997). Blomqvist assumes that a random
state-of-the-world variable represents exogenous shocks to the consumers
health status and is not observable to the insurer: the amount to be paid
to the consumers can only depend on their health care expenditures. The
qualitative results he derives from the resulting optimal control problem are
analogous to our ndings in (13). More specically, he emphatically rejects
the optimality of a linear scheme with a xed insurance rate and shows that
there should be more generous insurance for larger expenditures, conditional
on the demand elasticities. Our vector of insurance rates (1; :::; S) can be
seen as a discrete approximation of his non-linear scheme; this is especially
obvious when considering his numerical illustration, in which he implements
a discrete version of his general model.
4 Third best: Ex post moral hazard under an ex-
plicit deductible
The previous analysis strongly suggests that some stop-loss feature should
be part of the optimal insurance policy, even in a setting with ex post moral
hazard: this simply reects the original intuition of Arrows theorem that
it is optimal to focus insurance on the states with the largest expenditures.
Moreover, as noted before, stop-loss arrangements are indeed present in
many contracts and countries and played an important role in the RAND-
experiment. However, as we explained in the previous section, the second
best-insurance scheme with state-specic s cannot be implemented as such.
We therefore turn now to what could be called a third best-policy, in which
an explicit stop loss arrangement is introduced into the health insurance
contract. We will show that such a stop-loss arrangement should take the
form of a deductible, i.e. there should be no insurance for expenses below
the stop-loss amount.
When the insurance policy refers explicitly to an upper bound D on the
medical expenses borne by the insured, then (s)he will choose ex post Ms
such that f 0s(Ms) = 0 whenever Ms > D instead of f 0s = (1   s)g0s as in
eq. (9). Therefore, overconsumption will increase. This has implications for
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the structure of the insurance rates s in the states with Ms < D.
With an explicit stop-loss, the optimal policy problem becomes
max
s;D
 =
X
Ms<D
ps [fs(Ms(s)) + g(W      (1  s)Ms(s))]
+
X
Ms>D
ps [fs(Ms) + g (W     D)] (14)
under the constraints
 = (1 + )
24 X
Ms<D
pssMs(s) +
X
Ms>D
ps(Ms  D)
35 (15)
f 0s = (1  s)g0s if Ms < D; f 0s = 0 if Ms > D: (16)
The rst-order conditions for s (for the states with Ms < D) are iden-
tical to those that were derived in the second best-setting of the previous
section see eqs. (10), (11) and (12), leading to the conclusion (13), which
is repeated here for convenience:
either s = 0 or g0s = (1 + )g
0(1 + s): (17)
In di¤erentiating  w.r.t. D, attention must be paid to the fact that
the two sums dening  are dened with reference to D. If (and only if)
there exists some s such that Ms = D, then raising D (innitesimally)
will transfer s from the second sum to the rst.10 Note that the cost to
the agent of Ms = D is the same as would result from s = 0. We shall
evaluate @@D at unchanged Ms and justify that procedure on the basis of
our conclusion. Accordingly:
@
@D
=  
X
Ms>D
ps
"
g0s   (1 + )
X
t
ptg
0
t
#
6 0; D @
@D
= 0: (18)
The argument of g is constant over all s such that Ms > D; namely W  
  D: Write, as before, g0D for g0(W     D). Then (18) entails
either D = 0 or g0D = g
0(1 + ): (19)
Eq. (19) gives a clear rule for xing the optimal value of D. Note that, if
medical expenses are very large in some states, g0 and therefore g0D and D
10Lowering D innitesimally will not trigger a transfer because Ms < D in the rst
sum.
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may also be very large.11 Yet, this does not detract from the principle that
an optimal insurance plan should include a stop-loss arrangement.
Combining (17) and (19), we obtain
if sD > 0; then g0s = g
0
D(1 + s) > g
0
D:
With g(:) concave, g0s > g0D implies W      (1  s)Ms < W     D; and
therefore Ms > D: This contradicts the condition Ms < D dening the rst
sum. Accordingly, either s = 0 or D = 0: Thus, if D > 0, then s = 0, so
that Arrows theorem holds without the condition that s be independent
of s. Also, if s = 0; the assumption of unchanged Ms underlying (18) is
veried.
We can summarize these results as
Proposition 2 If resources are state-independent, preferences are separable
with state-independent consumption preferences and the probabilities of the
di¤erent states cannot be inuenced by the consumer, an optimal stop-loss
insurance policy takes the form of a deductible, i.e. there is no reimburse-
ment for expenses below the stop-loss amount and full reimbursement of the
excess of expenses over the deductible.
Proposition 2 is a striking illustration of the strength of the logic un-
derlying Arrows theorem of the deductible. Even in a situation with ex
post moral hazard, it is optimal to spend insurance funds in the states with
the largest expenditures. It is not optimal to have insurance below the de-
ductible, even in a setting with ex post moral hazard. Additional arguments
are needed to justify the kind of rst-dollar insurance arrangements that
were included in the RAND-experiment or that we observe in the Belgian
maximum billing-system.
5 Ex ante moral hazard
It has already been suggested in the literature that a deductible is not neces-
sarily optimal in health insurance contracts as soon as we take into account
11This is in line with the empirical results of Manning and Marquis (1996), who nd
that an optimal plan with a stop-loss would imply a very high value for the latter and,
indeed, claim that they were unable to nd a plausible estimate of the optimal stop-loss
within the range of the Health Insurance Experiment data(p. 631).
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the preventive value of some health services (e.g. Bardey and Lesur, 2005).
In this section we will further explore this argument. We distinguish two
possible cases. In subsection 5.1, we follow the literature (Ellis and Man-
ning, 2007; Zweifel et al., 2009) and model identiable preventive actions
that are taken before the health state realizes. One can think about lifestyle
variables (such as smoking, drinking, dieting or physical activity) or about
general medical screening. We will show that such preventive actions should
in general be subsidized. In subsection 5.2, we assume that prevention is
linked to medical expenditures in relatively healthy states and that it is
impossible to distinguish the curative and the preventive component, for
instance in regular visits to the GP.12 This justies some insurance below
the deductible.
In both cases we retain the model of the previous section, i.e. a model
with an explicit deductible D. In order to bring out the e¤ect of prevention
with a maximum of clarity, we rely on a simplied version of our model.
There are only two states of health, s and t, where s denotes a state of
standardhealth, whereas t corresponds to a disease calling for an expen-
sive therapy. As in the example given before, the goodhealth state could
be one in which only ambulatory care is needed, while the badhealth state
would require hospitalization and intensive follow-up treatment. As we have
shown in the previous section, under socially e¢ cient health insurance, the
high cost Mt will be largely covered, i.e. the expenses for the patient will
be limited to the deductible D. Moreover, if we do not take into account
the e¤ect of prevention, we found that in the optimum insurance contract
s = 0:
5.1 General preventive behaviour
We denote the costs incurred for prevention by x: This preventive behaviour
lowers the probability that the agent ends up in the expensive bad health
state t; i.e. dptdx < 0 and
d2pt
dx2
> 0. In this subsection we assume (i) that
the insured assesses correctly the impact of x on pt, and (ii) that x can be
subsidized as part of the insurance contract. Call the subsidy rate :
12A di¤erent approach to prevention has been worked out in Eeckhoudt et al. (2008).
They compare (i) a strategy in which patients apply preventive measures before knowing
if they have the disease and (ii) a wait and treatstrategy, in which patients are treated
only if they contract the disease.
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The optimization problem then becomes
max
s;D;
 = (1  pt(x)) [fs(Ms) + g(W   (1  )x     (1  s)Ms)]
+pt(x) [ft(Mt) + g(W   (1  )x    D)] (20)
subject to
 = (1 + ) [(1  pt(x))sMs + pt(x)(Mt  D) + x] :
Of course, the rst order condition onD just becomes a simplied version
of eq. (18)):
@
@D
=  ptg0t + ptg0 (1 + ) 6 0; D
@
@D
= 0 (21)
and the same is true for the rst order condition (16) on s provided we
neglect the possible e¤ect of s on x.
We focus here on the e¤ect of prevention. An agent that is insured with
a contract as specied in the previous section (i.e. with s = 0 and D > 0)
will decide about x without taking into account the e¤ect on the premium
. This leads to the following condition:
@
@x
j = dpt
dx
[ft + gt   (fs + gs)] 

(1  pt)g0s + ptg0t

(1  ) = 0: (22)
Note that, although the agent does not take into account the e¤ect on
the premium, he will still invest in prevention because of the utility gain
in moving from state t to state s. In fact, condition (22) is well known
in the literature on prevention and admits the same interpretation as the
willingness-to-pay for safetyin the literature on the value of life (see, e.g.,
Dehez and Drèze, 1982). Indeed, it can be rewritten as
 

dpt
dx
 1
=
dx
dpt
=
(fs + gs)  (ft + gt)
[(1  pt)g0s + ptg0t] (1  )
: (23)
The willingness-to-pay for a lower probability of ending up in the expensive
bad health state through extra prevention dx is equal to the ratio of (i)
the associated benet in utility terms (fs + gs)  (ft + gt), and (ii) the net
marginal utility cost of x, i.e. the expected marginal cost of one additional
unit of x, taking into account the subsidy rate : It follows from eqs. (22)
and (23) that dxd > 0.
13
13The impact of risk aversion and of prudence on optimal prevention has been analysed
by Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) and Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) respectively.
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Let us now look at the socially optimal value of x, i.e. taking into account
the e¤ect on the premium. This results in the following rst-order condition
@
@x
j   g0(1 + )

 + p0t(Mt  D   sMs)

= 0: (24)
The additional term in this expression captures the e¤ect of changes in
x on the premium  (evaluated through g0). Under the assumption that
individuals choose x so as to satisfy eq. (22), we can immediately derive an
explicit solution for the optimal  :
 = p0t(x) [sMs   (Mt  D)] : (25)
The subsidy rate  should obviously be zero if p0t(x) = 0, i.e. if prevention
is not e¤ective. It will be positive if Mt   D > sMs: Note that this will
always be the case if s = 0 as per a straight deductible scheme. Hence, we
can conclude that it is optimal to subsidize x. This result is close to that of
Ellis and Manning (2007).14
The treatment of prevention in this section does not o¤er an immediate
argument to move away from the straight Arrow-deductible result. Subsidiz-
ing preventive behaviour x can rather be seen as a complementary measure.
To give an example: subsidizing cancer screening will lower the premium by
lowering pt.
5.2 Treatment as prevention
It is often the case that regular doctor visits lead to an earlier diagnosis and
therefore improve the prospects of the patient, i.e. lower the probability
pt. Consulting a GP as soon as some symptoms are discovered may lead
to early detection of the threat of t and treatment of the disease at an
early stage may help avoiding to have to go to the emergency department
of the hospital, or may help avoiding more severe complications and hence
larger costs. The preventive aspect of these regular doctor visits cannot be
distinguished from the curative aspect, however. They are both included
in the expenditures Ms. Let us therefore now turn to a model in which
pt = pt(Ms) with
dpt
dMs
< 0:
The policy problem can then be formulated as follows
max
s;D
 = (1  pt(Ms)) [fs(Ms(s)) + g(W      (1  s)Ms(s))]
14Our expressions (22) and (24) are directly comparable to eqs. (12) and (13) in Ellis
an Manning (2007, p. 1138).
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+pt(Ms)) [ft(Mt) + g(W     D)]
subject to
 = (1 + ) [(1  pt(Ms))sMs(s) + pt(Ms)(Mt  D)] :
The rst-order condition for D remains as in eq. (21). However, the condi-
tion on Ms (or s) should now take into account the dependence of pt(:) on
Ms:
We follow the same procedure as in the previous subsection. We rst
consider the decisions taken by an insured patient, who disregards the impact
of Mt  D on the premium . The private rst order condition on Ms
is then given by
@
@Ms
j=(1  pt)

f 0s   g0s(1  s)

+
dpt
dMs
[ft + gt   (fs + gs)]=0: (26)
The rst term in this condition is well-known from the previous sections
- see (9) or (16). The second term already appeared in the previous sub-
section (see eq. (22). This term will be positive if ft + gt is smaller than
fs + gs, which motivates the prevention. Therefore eq. (26) implies that
f 0s < g0s(1   s), meaning that expenditures Ms will be larger than in the
situation without prevention. Eq. (26) again admits an interpretation in
terms of marginal benets and marginal costs, similar to eq. (23), but with
an adjusted denition of the marginal cost: this now becomes g0s(1 s) net
of the direct marginal benet f 0s.
The rst order condition (26) may be compared with the condition den-
ing a socially e¢ cient level of Ms, i.e. taking into account the implications
of Ms for the premium . This condition for social optimality is given by
(compare with eq. (24)):
@
@Ms
=
@
@Ms
j   g0 (1+)

(1 pt)s+ dpt
dMs
(Mt D sMs)

=0: (27)
The last term in this expression reects the additional incentive for preven-
tive care linked to the associated reduction in .
Just as we did for , we can solve condition (27) explicitly for s, under
the assumption that the insured selectsMs such that @@Ms j = 0. This yields
s =
psMs
1 + psMs
(Mt  D)
Ms
(28)
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where we used the obvious property that dpsdMs =  
dpt
dMs
and dened psMs =
Msdps
psdMs
> 0, the elasticity of ps with respect toMs. This optimality condition
directly implies that s should be larger than 0, unless psMs = 0; i.e. unless
there is no prevention e¤ect. We therefore nd a justication for some
insurance of the low standardmedical expenses Ms below the deductible
 a departure from our result in section 4. Note that nothing guarantees
that s, as dened in (28), satises s 6 1: It can be optimal to subsidize
Ms if (Mt D) and psMs are relatively large and this holds even if  > 0:
This result is due to the fact that prevention helps containing insurance
costs and this remains justied when  is high: the deterrent to insurance is
o¤set by the lower probability of the expensive therapy. In the more realistic
case (with 0 < s < 1) as would obtain for instance if the elasticity psMs
is small enough condition (28) provides a clear guideline for setting the
optimal s.
While the analysis in this section was cast in terms of prevention, it is
closely related to the insights that are put forward by Goldman and Philip-
son (2007) in their model with many health care commodities. They ar-
gue that the optimal structure of cost-sharing should take account of the
complementarity and substitution relationships between these di¤erent com-
modities; for instance subsidising medicines can be justied if the resulting
increase in pharmaceutical consumption (including improved medication ad-
herence) lowers hospital expenditures. The elasticity psMs in our analysis
plays the same role as the cross-price elasticities in the Goldman-Philipson
(2007)-model. In both cases, one nds an argument for a lower level of pa-
tient cost-sharing for small health expenses if this decreases the probability
of larger expenditures. Our formulation in terms of probabilities seems at
least as natural as the one of Goldman and Philipson (2007).
Proposition 3 If resources are state-independent and preferences are sep-
arable with state-independent consumption preferences, the desirability of
preventive behaviour (lowering the probability of the expensive health states)
justies some insurance below the deductible (i.e. s > 0) if health care
expenditures in a state of standard health have a negative e¤ect on the prob-
ability of getting into a state with large medical expenses, but the preventive
component of these expenditures cannot be identied as such.
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6 Conclusion
We have shown that the logic of Arrows theorem of the deductible, i.e. that
it is optimal to focus insurance on the states with largest expenditures, re-
mains at work in a model with ex post moral hazard. The optimal insurance
contract in a situation with ex post moral hazard takes the form of a system
of implicit deductibles, i.e. it results in the same indemnities as a contract
with 100% insurance above a variable deductible positively related to the
elasticity of medical expenditures with respect to the insurance rate. This
optimal scheme can seldom be implemented as such. We therefore turned
to an insurance scheme with an explicit stop-loss and showed that the com-
mon practice of rst-dollar insurance is not optimal in this standard model:
there should be no reimbursement for expenses below the stop-loss amount.
Again, the logic of Arrows theorem remains fully relevant.
Additional arguments are needed to justify the common practice of rst-
dollar insurance. In this respect we introduced the possibility of preventive
benets and showed that some insurance below the deductible is optimal if
health care expenditures in relatively healthy states have a negative e¤ect
on the probability of getting into a state with large medical expenses, as will
be the case e.g. for regular visits to a general practitioner. Other possible
arguments, not developed in this paper, could relate to the existence of
externalities not apt to be taken into account by the insured, for instance
risks of contagion, or the possibility that patients (and doctors) are poorly
informed about the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent treatments and should be guided
in the direction of optimal treatment choices by a clever design of cost-
sharing (Chernew et al., 2007; Pauly and Blavin, 2008). A more thorough
analysis of the latter argument calls for the explicit modelling of specic
health care services, a topic that lies outside the scope of this paper.
We worked within a model with a discrete number of (mutually exclu-
sive) health states. This makes it possible to derive transparent results
easily more easily in any case than with the optimal control approach
explored by Blomqvist (1997). In fact, we have shown that the optimal
health insurance policy will in general be nonlinear, and that the most pop-
ular modelling strategy, assuming a linear insurance scheme with a xed
coinsurance rate, may yield misleading results. Moreover, despite the re-
strictions of our model, it still allows us to recover the results on prevention
of Ellis and Manning (2007) and the basic intuition of the importance of
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o¤set-e¤ects as argued by Goldman and Philipson (2007).
The optimality of some stop-loss arrangement seems a quite robust result
 it directly follows from the equally robust intuition that it is better for
the consumer to insure expenses when disposable income is low rather than
high. This immediately suggests the important issue of the time dimension
of insurance, which was left open in this paper. In practice most stop-loss
arrangements are based on a xed time period, usually one year. In theory,
however, optimal insurance should take a life-time perspective  possibly
implemented through some form of cumulative averaging.Exploring the
implications of this, e.g. for the optimal compensations for the chronically
ill, is a topic for further research. Moreover, in this paper we focused on
the optimal design of the health insurance contract from the perspective
of an individual insured. In public health insurance schemes redistributive
considerations may play an important role the logic of Arrows theorem
then suggests the introduction of an income-dependent stop loss. Yet, a full
analysis of such public health insurance scheme would require the explicit
specication of a social welfare function and a careful consideration of the
relationship between health insurance and other redistributive instruments,
mainly the nonlinear income tax. This is also left for further research.
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